Examining ‘complete reunification’

• By Paul Lin 林保華
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On Monday morning last week, many Chinese investors woke up anticipating a raft of new stimulus measures to save the Chinese economy during an official Chinese Communist Party (CCP) news conference.

Instead, by about 5am the CCP had launched military exercises surrounding Taiwan. State media announced that China would “completely reunify” Taiwan with its “ancestral homeland.”

The refurbished Liaoning aircraft carrier, which had only days prior returned to its home berth at Yuchi Naval Base in China’s Shandong Province, was rushed back out to sea to traverse the Bashi Channel separating Taiwan and the Philippines to take its position for the exercises.

The large-scale drills did not last long, ending in time for an 8pm news broadcast. It seems that the CCP’s top officials had different ideas for the drills, cutting the exercises short only halfway through.

This was not a highly sophisticated drill.

Apart from pushing Taiwanese further away, the party also chose an odd time to conduct the drills, given that former president Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) was on a tour of several Taiwan-friendly European countries. Did the CCP forget it wanted to punish Tsai for all the supposed transgressions she committed during her eight years as president?

“Complete reunification” was the specific phrasing Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) used on Oct. 1 in an address on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) National Day. The prefix “complete” is new. China’s state media followed along with the script that CCP “Chairman Xi is ushering us forward.”

The change is conceptually new and its implications should be explored.

President William Lai (賴清德) earlier this month said that China had not yet recovered the vast tract of land lost to the Russian Empire in the 1858 Treaty of Aigun. Perhaps China’s “complete reunification” naturally refers to its lost lands northwest and northeast of China. The timid Xi does not have the courage to take back those lands, even though this must have been what he had been referring to.

The term “complete reunification” means what Xi wants it to mean at any given time. For the time being, given the CCP’s standard operating procedure of hiding its strength and biding its time, the term refers to neighboring countries in the south.

Which of those have been Chinese territories?

Those who have read the entirety of the 120-chapter Chinese classic Water Margin (水滸全傳) likely know that the classic novel’s despotic dynasty quells the hero-protagonists’ fortresses along Liangshan Marsh in what is today China’s Shandong Province, causing the protagonists to scatter. Among them is the character Li Jun (李俊) — nicknamed “River Dragon” (混江龍) — who left for what is now Myanmar and established himself there as a ruler.

Despite being a work of fiction, it cannot be ruled out that it has some historical basis. The CCP and Myanmar’s military junta government are as thick as thieves. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army or China’s judiciary are free to work with the Burmese army in northwestern Myanmar in campaigns to root out crime syndicates or ethnic rebel armies. China’s first steps in “restoring” this piece of territory in a “complete reunification” might not be far off.

Historical records show that there was a Han Chinese ruler of the Kingdom of Siam (now Thailand), Taksin the Great (鄭昭), who lived from 1734 to 1782. After his reign, Thailand’s nobility and royal court consisted of several officials who by virtue of having Han blood could claim Chinese ancestry. The CCP leadership can be expected to start talking about how Thailand has been Chinese territory “since ancient times.”

Next is the landmass of mainland Southeast Asia, formerly called “Indochina,” comprising Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Chinese detest the word “zhina” (支那), a neutral transliteration originally from Sanskrit referring to “China,” which became a pejorative used by Imperial Japan. Despite the CCP’s objections, if the name’s use is suitable proof that the land has been Chinese territory since ancient times, then perhaps the CCP might readily accept it.

The streets of Laos’ capital, Vientiane, are filled with signage written in simplified Chinese, an obvious representation of the export of Chinese culture to Laos.

The CCP and even Hong Kong’s “autonomous” government see Laos as a primary associate, friendly to Beijing and close to turning into a Chinese quasi-colony.

It is obvious how close Cambodian-Chinese ties are due to Phnom Penh’s affinity for Beijing, with many Chinese crime syndicates entrenched there as a secondary base of operations.

Whole chapters could be written about Vietnam’s historic enmity toward China, but the relationship is at its heart a close one, greatly improved in recent years.

In August, Vietnamese Communist Party General Secretary and Vietnamese President To Lam continued treading the pro-China line of former Vietnamese president Nguyen Phu-trong by paying an official visit to Beijing, where To met with Xi. During the meeting, To declared that Vietnam would join China’s Belt and Road Initiative, and in return would receive China’s help to construct new railroads.

On Sept. 29, a Vietnamese fishing vessel was intercepted by a China Coast Guard ship near the Paracel Islands (Xisha Islands, 西沙群島). Forty coast guard personnel boarded the Vietnamese vessel and met no resistance. Allegedly they severely beat 10 Vietnamese fishers with iron bars and stole US$20,000 in fishing equipment all in a show of “brotherly camaraderie.”

On Oct. 10, Chinese Premier Li Qiang (李強) met with To and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh in Hanoi. The two countries signed 10 agreements to realize their spirit of “brotherly camaraderie.” What do they have to say for ordinary Vietnamese who are threatened with loss of life and limb at sea?

Paul Lin is a Taipei-based political commentator.

Translated by Tim Smith